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Abstract
The  interaction between  monetary  and  fiscal  policy is at the heart of
macroeconomics,  but traditional  analysis  often ignores  the institutional
aspects.  In recent  years a developing  I iterature has  concentrated  on
issues  such  as the influence  of central bank  independence  on the conduct  of
monetary  policy, and  as a part of this,  the extent to wh'ich  the central
bank  accommodates  government  fiscal  pojjcy.  Much  less has  been  done,
however,  to jnVestigate  the reverse  interactjon:  the extent to which
central bank  independence  influences  the formation  of fiscal  policy.  This
paper  concentrates  pnimarily on that channel  of jnfluence, and  finds some
support  for the case  that fiscal  policies are indeed  affected by the
independence  of the centr"al  bank.  Fi  scal defjcjts,  for examp'le,  may
therefore be lowelin  countries  with more  independent  central banks  because
of the greater prospect  that monetary  policy wilI  not be as accommodative
of those  def  icits.
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1. Introduction
There  is a large and  expanding  I  iterature on the role that fjscal  po]  icy,
in particular government  budget  deficits,  has.in determining  monetary
policy.  Although  causal  influence  of defjcits  on  monetary  policy is by no
means  universaliy accepted  (see, for example,  Dwyer,  1982)  such  an effect
is supported  in studies  that jnclude  Blinder (1983), Burdekin  (1986a),
Laney  and  |rlillett (1983)  and  Mcl,4ill  in (1936).1  In general,  however,  it  is
assumed  (implicitly  or explicitly)  that there is  no reverse  direction of
causal  i  ty runn  ing from  monetary  pol  i  cy to fi scal po1i  cy.2
Sargent  and  lriallace  (1981),  to take one  popular  example,  primarily
focus  on the case  where  the time paths  of both government  spending  and  tax
revenues  are fjxed --  a situation in wh'ich  it  is the monetary  authority
that,  by design,  must  capitulate to the fiscal  authority.  However,  the
same  framework  is equally applicable  to the case  where  the monetary
authority moves  first  and  sets policy independently. Here, 
'1ower 
rates of
money  growth  sooner  or later require ldwer  deficits  and  the monetary
authority imposes  discipi  ine on the fiscal  authority.  To take the argument
one  step further,  if  the fiscal  authority faces  an independent  central bank
commitled  to anti-inf.lationary pol  icy,  then the expectatjon  that deficits
will  not be accommodated  tomorrow  may  deter the government  from  running  a
deficit  today.  Therefore  it  is predicted  that, ceteris parjbus,  defjcit
expansion  should  be lower  in countries  w'ith  more  independent  central
3 Dan  Ks  .
The  possible  importance  of such  a reverse  direction of influence is
suggested  by Sargent  (1985),  who  characterizes  the combination  of tight-L-
money  and  large deficits  promised  aL the inception  of the Reagan
administration  as coordination  via resort to a "game  of chicken.r' Here,
"jf  the monetary  authority could successfully  stick to its  guns  and  forever
refuse to monetize  any  government  debt, then eventually  the arithmetic of
the government's  budget  constrajnt would  compel  the fiscal  authority to
back  down  and  to swing  its  budget  jnto balancerr  (Sargent,  1985,  p. 248).
It'i  s possible  that 'i  n such  circumstances  the monetary  authority may  be the
one  to capjtulate by monetizing  a large proportion  of the deficit,  but if
it  does  not then fiscal  policy is necessarily  constrained.
The  role of the monetary  regime  is  stressed  in Sargentrs  (1982)
argument  that the creation of an independent  central bank, 1ega11y
committed  to refuse  the government's  demand  for additional unsecured
credit,  was  crucial in ending  the hyperinflations in each  of Germany,
Austria, Hungary  and  Poland. Sargent  states that "once  it  became  widely
understood  that the government  would  not rely on the central bank  for  its
finances, the inflation  termjnated  and  the exchanges  stabilized'r (Sargent,
1982,  p. 89).  0n the other hand,  the importance  of an independent  monetary
policymaker  has  been  examined  by Banaian,  Laney  and  Willett  (1983)  who
obtain cross-sectional  evidence  for the post-1960  period suggesting  that
central bank  autonomy  exerts an independent  inf'l  uence  on the rate of
inflation.  The  indicated  significance  of dummy  variables  for the high]y
autonomous  central banks  of Switzerland,  the United  States, and  viest
Germany  also supports  the Parkin  and  Bade  (1978,  1979)  finding that these
banks,  which  are more  independent  of centra'l  government  both in actual
pol  icymaking  and  in the appointment  of directors, have  del  ivered a iower
rate of inflation  than other less independent  central banks.4This paper  seeks  to quantify the effect  independent  central banks  may
have  not just  on the rate of inflatjon  but also on the behavior  of the
fiscal  authority.  The  empirical analysis uses  pooled  cross-section  data
for twelve industrial  ized countries  over the 1960-1983  Deriod.  The
international natune  of the study  permjts  the effect of different
institutional  arrangements  to be evaluated  direct'ly.
2. Deve'lopment  of the Empirical  Procedure
In order to isolate any  effect exerted  by the independence  of the monetary
authority,  it  is first  necessary  to jointly  specify fiscal  and  monetary
poljcy reaction functions.  In line with the findings of Bradley  and  Potter
(1986)  and  Turnovsky  and  Wohar  (1985), fiscal  policy is assumed  to be
chiefly directed toward  the ful1-employment  objective, and  monetary  policy
directed toward  the prjce-stabil  ity  objective.  The  budget  deficit  is a]so
taken  to be 'influenced  by the rate of real growth, in part due  to built-in
automatic  stabilizatjon.  Gjven  the high degree  of monetary  openness
featured  by many  of the countrjes in the sample,  external influence  on the
monetary  base  is also hypothesjzed  to be jmportant.  In the absence  of
complete  sterilization  by the central bank,  an jnflow of foreign assets
will  necessarily  lead  to an increase  in the domestjc  money  stock.  To an
extent, 'in other words,  under  both fixed and  flexible  exchange  rates the
management  of the monetary  base  is  some  combinatjon  of foreign and  domestic
portfolio  decisjons  by the central bank.  Finally, the primany  hypothesis
tested in this  paper  is whether,  jn addition to a possible  influence  of
fiscal  pol  icy on  monetary  policy, there is also a causal  effect running
from  monetary  poljcy to fiscal  policy.-+-
For the present  cross-country  study  the variables in the reactjon
functions are primarily drawn  from  OECD  (1984).  The  stance  of fiscal
policy is measured  by the ievel of the budget  deficit  relatjve to GDP. The
stance of monetary  policy  is  measured  by the rate of  growth of  the monetary
base.  Data  for twelve jndustrialized countrjes  are used  for the analysir,
and  the data are pooled  using  average  values  of each  varjable over the four
time periods  of 1960-1967,  1968-1973,  197  4-7979  and  1980-1983.  The  ljst  of
countries  comprises  Australia, Belgjum,  Canada,  France,  Ita1y, Japan,
Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  United  States  and  liest
Germany.  As  discussed  earlier,  Switzerland,  United  States  and  [4est  Germany
are the three countries  considered  to possess  independent  central banks.
Canadars  central bank  is  also classed  as independent  for the 1960-1967
period, following which  the Bank  of Canada  Act 1967  for the fjrst  time gave
the Minister of Finance  the power  to  issue  djrectives to the bank.
The  four time perjods  can  be said to correspond  to four very different
h'i  storical  episodes. The  1960-1967  period  was  one  in which  most  countries
enioyed  relatively  stable pr.ice  levels under  a fixed exchange  rate regime.
The  1968-1973  period  marked  the break-up  of Bretton  lrloods  and  the outbreak
of problems  with stagflation.  The  1974-1979  covers  the early experience
with float'ing exchange  rates, and  jncludes  the epj  sodes  of upward  energy
pnice shocks. Finally, the 1980-1983  period  covers  the years in which
there tlere significant moves  toward  stricter  monetary  control by the
worldrs  major  central banks  (inciuding the October  1979  announced  change  in
operating  procedures  by the Federal  Reserve  Board).5-tr-
The  model  to be estimated  is  set out below.  The  first  two equations
are, respectjvely, the fiscal  policy and  monetary  pol'icy  reactjon functions
di  scussed  above. Given  thal the inflation  variable is to be treated as an
endogenous  variabie in the analysis, an inflation  equatjon  is  specified in
addition to the two policy reaction functions.  The  inflation  equation
reflects the simple  quantjty theory approach  that jnflation  will  be a
positive function of the rate of monetary  expansion  and  a negative  function
of the rate of real output growth.  Al  lowance  js made  in the model  for
independence  dummjes  set equal  to one  for the three countries  with
independent  central banks,  plus Canada  (1960-1967).6  Final'ly  a series of
'shiftr  dummies  are specified in order to test  for  structural breaks  across
the di  fferent time i  nterval  s i  ncl  uded  i  n the regressi  on analysi  s.
lrle  have:
(1)
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Endogenous:  DEF,  DF1B,  DP-6-
Exogenous:  UN,  DY,  FA,  DI, DS
where  DEF  'i  s the budget  deficjt  divided by GDP,
Dl.lB  js  the rate of  growth of  the monetary  base,
UN 'i  s the unemployment  rate,
DY is the percenLage  change  in real GDP,
DP is  the percentage  change  in the GDP  deflator,
FA  js the rate of growth  of foreign assets  of the central bank
DI  js the central bank  independence  dummy,
DS is a shift  dummy  defined  for the different  sub-periods,
u1, ,2,  u3 are error terms.
The  model  thus consists of three exactly-identified equations  with
three endogenous  variables.  Given  that the observations  are averages  taken
over periods  of several  years, it  seems  reasonable  to take the unemployment
rate as being  exogenous,  which  also accords  with the natural rate
hypothesis. Foreign  assets  in the central bankrs  portfol io and  the rate of
real growth  are also exogenous.  The  period shift  dummy  js excluded  from
the deficit  equatjon  because  monetary  policy and  jnflation  rates are seen
as being  more  directly  affected by such  events  as the switch  to floating
exchange  raLes  and  the move  toward  str'icter monetary  control after  1979.
3. Estimation  Results
Each  equation  is estimated  by tv./o-stage
exogenous  vaniab  les as i  nstrumenLs.  The
dummy  defjned, first,  for the 1960-1967
ieast squares,  using  the excluded
model  was  estimated  with the shift
period, and  then for each  of the-/-
other three sub-periods  in turn.  Here,  the 1980-1983  dummy  alone  was
significant at better than the five  percent  level in the monetary  pol  icy
equation.  (No  shift  dummy  was  significant jn the inflation  equation.)
Accordingly,  the results reported  in Table  l  are for D. set equal  to one
for the i980-i983  period and  zero elsewhere.
The  results reveal each  of the variables in the monetary  and  fiscal
pol  icy equations  to be of the expected  sign.  The  fjscal  pol  jcy neaction
function features a strong  and  highly significant countercyclical  response
to unemployment.  lJse  of fiscal  policy as a stabilizatjon tool  is further
suggested  by the negative  response  to the real growth  variable, DY --  the
coeffjcient on  which,  while not significant at the ten or five percent
levels, at  least exceeds  ils  standard  u""o..7  The  positive response  to
monetary  base  growth,  and  negative  sign on the independence  dummy,  each  is
consistent  with the hypothesized  reverse  direction of causal  ity  running
from  monetary  to fiscal  poljcy.  Gjven  the insignificant coeffjcient on the
monetary  base,  however,  it  appears  here  that the question  of central bank
independence  aspects  may  be more  impontant  than observed  rates of monetary
expa  n  s  r  on.
The  negative  coefficienl  on the independence  dummy  in the fi scal
equation  suggests  that,  after taking account  of other factors, deficits  are
'lowelin 
countries  with an independent  central bank  than in countries in
which  the central bank  is more  under  the control of government.  The
independence  dummy  is weakly  significant,  at the ten percent  1eve1  , perhaps
not so  disappointing  in light  of complex  institutional  factors involved.
In further analysis, the independence  dummy  was  redefined  so that it  was-6-
set equal  to one  only for Switzerland  and  West  Germany.  Unljke the United
States  and  Canada  (i950-1967),  the Swiss  and  West  German  central banks  are
independent  of government  not only in pol  icymaking  but also in the
appojntment  of the Governor  and  members  of the central bank  pol  icy board
(see Parkin  and  Bade,  1978).  However,  the sign and  significance  of the
coefficient on the independence  dummy  was  unchanged  by this  redefinjtion --
and  the same  was  true for the coefficients on the other variables in the
a
fi scal equati  on."
The  monetary  policy equation  shows  a countercyclical  negative  response
to jnflation  that is  significant at the ten percent  leve'l  ,  There  js also a
highly significant positive response  to changes  in foreign assets  of the
central bank.  The  foreign assets  result is  symptomatic  of monetary  policy
interdependence  across  countries, and  suggests  an important  role for
inflows of high-powered  money  from  abroad. (Successful  steril ization of
such  flows by the central bank  would  lead to a negative  coeffjcient on the
foreign assets  variable, but it  is conventionally  accepted  that official
inLernatjonal  reserve  flows are not completely  sterilized.9)  The  negative
effect of the 1980-1983  shift  dummy  is consistent  l',ith the findings of
Laney  (1985), and  with the internat'ional  moves  toward  monetary  tightening
in that period.  Interdependence  between  monetary  and  fiscal  policy is
supported  by the posjtive and  significant coefficient on the deficit.  The
independence  dummy,  however,  while having  the expected  negative  sign, has  a
standard  error larger than the coefficient,  perhaps  because  the effects of
such  independence  are captured  elsewhere  in the equation.The  results for the monetary  policy equation  suggest  that,  over the
full  sample,  there is a tendency  for central banks  to accommodate
government  budget  deficits.  Even  though  the jnsjgnificance of the
independence  dummy  in the monetary  policy equation  js  somewhat  surpri  sing,
the fiscal  policy resuits nevertheless  suggest  that central bank
independence  has  discouraged  deficit  expansion  'i  n Switzerland,  the United
States, |liest  Germany  and  Canada  (1960-1967). Thus,  despite the burgeoning
deficits  in the ljnited States, the resu'lts  suggest  these  deficits  might
have  been  larger still  had  the Federal  Reserve  not been  independent  of
government.
Central bank  independence  is also found  to play a signifjcant negative
nole jn the inflation  equation.  The  infiation  equation  otherwise  shows  the
expected  positive effect of monetary  base  growth  and  negative  effect of
real output growth.  The  finding that countries  with independent  central
banks  tend to have  lower inflatjon  rates may  well be strongly influenced  by
the impl  ications of central bank  independence  for fiscal  policy.  G'iven  the
two-vray  causal  ity  suggested  in the results,  it  indeed  appears  that lower
deficits  imply reduced  pressure  for monetary  accommodation  --  a pressure
whi  ch eventual  ly determi  nes  the i  nfl  ati  on rate.  Even  nomi  nal  ly  i  ndependent
central banks,  such  as the Federal  Reserve,  may  sti11 be subiect  to this
pressure  in at least ,or" dag"a".10
5. Conc  I  usi  ons
Results  presented  here indicate that an independent  monetary  policymaker
can  exert a sjgnificant influence  on the course  of fiscal  policy, and  also-10-
on the inflation  nate.  Cross-country  anaiysis suggest  that, vihen  both
fjscal  and  monetary  policy are treated as endogenous  variabies, tlro-vtay
causal  ity  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policymaking  'i  s found  to be
important.  Central bank  independence  is  indicated to have  retarded  the
expansion  of government  budget  deficits  in Switzerland,  the United  States
and  West  Germany,  and  this  independence  aiso appears  to have  exerted  a
neqative  effect on the inflation  rate.-  11-
TABLE  1
Results  for the lv|odel  of Fiscal  and  llonetary  Interdependence
DEF  =  -0.56  +  0.11  DMB  +  0.76  UN -  0.29  DY -  1.39  DI
(1.46)  (0.14)  (0.16)**  (0.26)  (0.87)*
R  = 0.54
DMB  =  10.89  +  0.87  DEF  -  0.91  Dp +  0.26  FA -  1.02  DI  -  5.42  DS
(3.03)** (0.59)*  (0.64)*  (0.09)*'r  (1.96)  (2.24)**
2
R  = 0.25
DP  =  5.53  +  0.7s  DMB  -  1.44  DY -  1.68  DI  .'  9.87  D5
(1.88)** (0.17)**  (0.29)'k*  (1.06)*  (1.33)
2
R  =  o.sl
Note:  Standard  errors are in parentheses,
** and  * denote  five and  ten percent  levels of significance  for a
one  tail  test.1.
- LL-
Footn  o  te  s
See  Barth, Sickles  and  Wiest  (1982)  for a comprehensive  ljst  of earlier
studies  of U.S. monetary  policy.  Cross-country  studies  of central bank
behavior  are more  limjted in number,  but examples  are Gordon  (1977),
Laney  (1985)  and  Sheehey  and  Kreinin (1985).
An  exception  is Ahking  and  Miller  (1985),  who  model  the time-serjes
relationship between  government  deficits,  monetary  base  growth  and
inflatjon  for the United  States  as a trivariate  autoregressive  process.
Ahking  and  14iller find some  evidence  of two-way  causal  ity  between
deficits  and  monetary  base  growth  for the 1950s  and  1970s,  while for
the 1960s  there is  only one-way  causality running  from  deficits  to
monetary  policy.  E1  sewhere,  further U.S. time series analysis  by
Bradley  and  Potter (1986)  and  by Turnovsky  and  lriohar  (1985)  suggest
only a one-way  direction of causality.  However,  in the former  case  the
causality is fr"om  fiscal  po'l  jcy to monetary  policy, while in the latter
study  causality fnom  monetary  to fiscal  policy is the only linkage
found  to be empirically important.  At the same  time, each  of these  two
studies  discerns  a common  assignment  of instruments  to targets --  with
fiscal  policy found  to be responsive  to the unemployment  rate and
monetary  policy responsive  to the jnflation  rate.
The  discipline  imposed  by the monetary  authority may,  however,  by its
very nature  tend to be a factor pertinent more  to the long run than to
the short run.  Blinder (1982,  1983)  depicts the policy process  as the
outcome  of a game  in which  the monetary  policymaker  is taken  to have  a
2.
J.preference  for contractjonary  policy, and  the fiscal  authority a
preference  for expansionary  policy.  Here,  Bl  inder shows  that,  in a
short run sense,  the Nash  equi  libr"ium  ensues  in the position where  the
monetary  pol  icymaker  plays contraction and  the fjscal  policymaker
expansion  --  and  he suggests  that this  is a Inatural candidater  for the
outcome  of the game  even  should  both players prefer an easy  money/tight
budget  scenari  o.
4.  The  Swiss  case  is examined  by Burdekin  (1986b),  where  a strongly
negative  effect of inflation  on monetary  base  growth  was  found.  In
conjunction  wjth a tendency  to offset rather than accommodate  federal
budget  deficits,  the results appeared  to fjrmly  support  the
independence  of the Swiss  National  Bank.
5.  Internatjonal moves  toward  monetary  tightness in the post-1979  period
are documented  by Laney  (1985).  Laney  finds evjdence  of a significant
policy shift  over the 7979  4-7982  2 period for each  of Canada,  Japan
and  the United  States.  Although  the presently  employed  1980-1983
period extends  siightly  beyond  the period of monetary  tightness
identified  by Laney,  it  nevertheless  appears  preferable  to tneating the
1974-1983  period  as a single unit.
6,  In the jnflation  equation,  one  might  expect  Di to operaLe  only through
DMB. It  is  important  to recal  l  here, however,  that central bank
independence  might  be reflected in some  measure  by other tools of
monetary  policy in addjtion to operations  on the monetary  base  --
changes  in reserve  requirements,  for example  --  so that DI might  play
an independent  role in this  equation  also.  To specify a more  broadly7.
-  14-
defined  monetary  aggregate  in the equation  itself  presents  a rather
intractable problem  in jnternatjonal cross-sectional  work, because  the
appropriate  definition  of money  is  1ike1y  to vary both across  countries
and  over ti me.
Itlulticoll  inearity betvieen  UN  and  DY  could  easily contribute to lower
significance  for the DY  variable.  A)  so, in unreported  regressions,
allowance  was  made  in the fiscal  equation  for an effect of changes  in
government  spending  levels,  However,  when  the rate of growth  of real
government  purchases  (corresponding  to certain theoretical
considerations  raised by Barro, 1979)  was  tested as an explanatory
variable jn the regressjon,  it  was  found  to be insignificant and  of the
incorrect sign.  Government  employment  as a percentage  of total
employment  was  I ikewise  found  to be insign.i  ficant.
In a further re-defjnition of the independence  dummy,  the 1980-1983
period for the United  States  (corresponding  to the tenure  of Chairman
Paul  Volcker)  was  included  alongside  Swjtzerland  and  \liest  Germany.  The
independence  dummy  was  significant jn this case,  but whj  le interesting,
because  there was  no constitutional change  in central bank  independence
separating  the 1980-1983  period from the rest of the U.5. experience,
this  re-definjtion  has  somewhat  less theoretjcal justification  than
those  discussed  in the text.  Moreover,  Volcker's tenure  as Federal
Reserve  Chajrman  corresponded  to and  explos'ion  of fiscal  deficits  in
the United  States, which  does  little  to reinforce the hypothesis  that
fiscal  poiicy was  much  infl uenced  by any  increased  monetary  discipline.J.
10.
For one  survey  of the extent of sterilization  over portions of the
jnterval examined  here, see  Laney  and  WjIIett (1982).
Milier  (1983)  also argues  in favor of a direct link  between  deficits
and  inflation  in the united States.  14iller stresses  that,  even  in the
absence  of monetary  accommodatjon,  private monetizatjon  of deficits
and/or  crowding  out can  still  lead to jnflation.  In particular,
nonmonetized  defjcits  are seen  as leading  to higheLinterest rates, and
in turn to crowdjng  out of private investment  and  a reduced  rate of
growth  of real output  h,hich,  lvith a given  money  supply, leads  to higher
prices.  Here,  Ahking  and  Miller  (1985)  do in fact provide  some
supportive  evjdence  that government  deficits  were  inflationary  in the
1950s  and  1970s. A problem  with this  approach  may  Ije  in the integral
proposition  that higher  deficits  lead to higher interest rates --  a
proposjtion  frequently  questioned. See,  for example,  Evans  (1985).-  16-
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